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Passage Recall:

Schema Change and Cognitive Fle:xibility

Paula T. Hertel, Merith Cosden, and Peder J. Johnson
University of New Mexico

·

This experiment investigated the effects of subsequent related information
and individual differences in cognitive flexibility on prose recall. Subjects
read a passage and then were given either consistent or contradictory inciden
tal information. Errors in cued recall, reflecting the nature of the subsequent
information, were more frequently produced after a 3-week delay than after

2 days.

These results were consistent with Spiro's findings with free recall.

In addition, 3-week subjects were more confident about correct recall than er
rors, indicating that errors resulted, in part, from retrieval processes. The
negative relationship of spontaneous flexibility and the positive relationship
of adaptive flexibility to constructive error are interpreted in terms of storage
and retrieval effects in memory.

The present study was concerned with
are predictive of the degree to which existing
the dynamic nature of memory schemata
schemata assimilate or accommodate con
flicting new inputs.
and the extent to which cognitive style may
relate to recall accuracy. Evidence from
In an attempt to systematically investigate
several sources (Anderson, Spiro, & Ander
mechanisms of schema change, Spiro (1975,
son, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Pi- . 1977) argued that varying the type of sub
sequent information should affect the degree
chert & Anderson, 1977; Royer & Cable,
1976; Sulin & Dooling, 1974) supports the
of error in what is remembered about the
notion that information is assimilated into
original event. For some subjects, he pre
sented incidental subsequent information
existing knowledge structures (schemata).
that was either consistent with or contra
From the perspective of schema theory (e.g.,
Piaget, 1952), a knowledge structure should
dictory to information in a story that
provide a framework not only for the as
subjects had previously read, predicting
similation of related information consistent
transformational errors in story recall for
with its content but also for the accommo
only those subjects who heard contradictory
information. Half of Spiro's subjects re
dation of its content to related but disparate
ceived memory instructions, whereas the
information.
The issue of accommodation has impor
others were deceived into believing that they
tant implications for education, some of
would be asked to evaluate the material at a
which have been suggested by Anderson
later time. Since memory instructions de
(1977). In terms of schema theory, all
mand isolation of passage information, er
rors were predicted for the deception con
knowledge acquisition is viewed as modifi
dition only. Retention was tested after 2
cation and differentiation of existing sche
mata. If the goals of education involve the
days, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. Following story
recall, all subjects were asked to rate each
change of knowledge, then we must be con
sentence in their recall protocol, according
cerned with the modification of existing
schemata when confronted with information
to their degree of confidence that it accu
rately represented information stated in the
requiring varying degrees of accommodation.
original story.
Furthermore, educational theory must be
As expected, Spiro found that all subjects
concerned with individual differences that
in the memory condition and those deceived
subjects who heard consistent subsequent
information were essentially accurate in
Requests for reprints should be sent to Paula T.
their recall. However, after long retention
Hertel, who is now at the Department of Psychology,
intervals (3 or 6 weeks), the deceived subjects
University of Minnesota, Duluth, Minnesota 55812.
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who heard contradictory information made
errors that reflected the nature of that in
formation. When similarly treated subjects
were tested after 2 days, these errors did not
occur. Therefore, schemata were not im
mediately modified by the presentation of
the subsequent information. Rather, during
the passage of time, subjects may have lost
the ability to distinguish information pre
sented in the story from information inferred
from the "aside" that was delivered subse
quently. This loss of ability may result from
confusion, or it may reflect hypothesized
changes in the story schema.
A stage analysis (cf. Crowder, 1976) of the
locus of schema change would indicate that
the effects in Spiro's experiment occurred
during information storage or at the time of
retrieval. Confidence ratings were obtained
to address this issue. The subjects who had
heard contradictory information and were
tested following 3 or 6 weeks were more
confident in errors influenced by the con
tradictory information than they were con
fident in accurate recall. This finding sug
gested to Spiro that the same reconstructive
process was used to produce accurate and
inaccurate recall; he concluded that errors
were not produced at retrieval, through the
use of a conscious guessing strategy, but re
sulted from modification of the schema
during storage.
The first purpose of this experiment was
to determine if Spiro's results were valid
under more stringent test conditions that in
turn would provide more evidence con
cerning the locus of schema change. The
fact that Spiro did not request confidence
ratings until after the story was recalled al
lows for the possibility that subjects who
were tested after longer delays had difficulty
retrieving enough information from the story
to comply with task demands, accessed the
subsequent information, and consciously or
unconsciously used it to elaborate their re
call. Regardless of the nature of the re
trieval processes, the test demands would
require subjects to integrate all information
to write a well-connected story. Thus, it is
possible that the subsequent confidence
ratings reflected integration at recall, as well
as the type of retrieval processing.
The following experiment departs from

Spiro in two important ways. First, a
cued-recall task was employed to reduce the
integrative demands of the test situation; if
the errors observed by Spiro reflected pro
cesses operating prior to retrieval, then the
type of recall test should not affect the
qualitative nature of the errors, although
their magnitude may be decreased by the
restrictive nature of the cues. Second,
confidence ratings were requested immedi
ately following each answer, requiring
subjects to monitor their retrieval efforts.
The second purpose of this experiment
was to examine individual differences in re
call accuracy from the theoretical perspec
tive of schema change. Since research con
cerned with knowledge structures places a
large emphasis on idiosyncratic processing
(Perfetti & Lesgold, 1977; Spiro, 1977), it is
reasonable to suggest that identifiable cog
nitive styles may correspond to processes
involved in schema change. Memory for
events may be transformed according to the
type of person who is processing the event.
Cognitive flexibility has been identified by
Guilford (1967) as an important factor in
discriminating among individual abilities.
Defined as the ability to shift avenues of
thinking in order to perceive and process
information about a situation in different
ways, cognitive flexibility is similar, on an
intuitive level, to a description of schema
change. In studies by Guilford and others
(Houston & Mednick, 1963; Munsinger &
Kessen, 1966; Vidler & Karan, 1975), cog
nitive flexibility has been associated with the
ability to tolerate and structure ambiguity.
Furthermore, Kaplan (1952) reported that
subjects with a high tolerance for instability
more readily recalled equivocal parts of
stories than did other subjects. These
findings suggest that at least one type of
cognitive flexibility, spontaneous or adap
tive, should be related to performance in this
experiment.
Spontaneous flexibility is conceptualized
as the ability to think in varied directions in
an unstructured situation, such as the inci
dental learning task in this experiment.
Tests for spontaneous flexibility do not re
quire flexibility for their solution, although
the magnitude of the score depends on the
spontaneous use of these processes. Simi-
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larly, the incidental nature of the subsequent
information in this experiment does not re
quire that it be kept separate from story in
formation. The test for another subfactor,
adaptive flexibility, does require flexible
thought processes for problem solving, and
therefore characterizes flexibility in situa
tions that demand it. The test conditions of
this experiment may be viewed as placing
certain restrictions on subjects' recall.
Logically, constructive effects that result
from storage mechanisms should be related
to spontaneous flexiblity, whereas those
occurring at testing should be related to the
amount of flexibility required by the recall
task, and thus to adaptive flexibility. More
generally, cognitive flexibility was expected
to be a reliable predictor of memory perfor
mance, in addition to the characteristics of
the experimental setting.
Method
Materials
The material to be recalled was adapted from Spiro's

(1975, 1977) passage about a young woman and man

who met in college, developed a romantic relationship,
and made marriage plans. The central theme of the
story concerned the young man's desire not to have
children and his hesitancy to inform the woman about
this desire. He finally does tell her, and the story ends
either with her sharing his desire not to have children
because she had always wanted a career (harmony), or
she becomes distraught by the news because she had
always wanted a large family (conflict).
Test booklets consisted of 10 questions, prompts, or
statements with a blank to be filled in; each of the 10
items was presented on a separate page. The first 5
filler items concerned details from the first part of the
story, and answers were not viewed as potential sources
of constructive errors. The remaining 5 items ad
dressed the nature of the relationship, and were con
structed to allow for intrusions emanating from the
subsequent bias. All items are presented in the fol
lowing display:
Cued Recall Test

1. When Bob and Margie met they were both
years old.
Bob was majoring in --·
Margie was majoring in --·
They didn't know each other until __.
Bob began to think he would like to marry Margie,
after he had known her for --·
Margie's feelings about Bob could be characterized
as:
When Bob asked Margie to marry him, she:
___

2.

3.
4.
!).

6.

7.
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8. Bob and Margie's feelings about having children
were:

9. What were Margie's goals for the future?
10. How did the story you read end?
For Items 6-10, a priori scoring continua were de
veloped to reflect the direction of possible errors. Zero
points were established for essentially accurate recall,
the negative range was reserved for errors leading to a
distortion of the conflict in the relationship, and the
positive range was relegated to errors that would in
crease the harmony. For Item 7 the continuum ranged
from hesitancy to say yes ( -5 to -1), to acceptance (0),
to enthusiasm ( + 1 to +5). Since magnitude was not
considered as important an aspect of the replication as
direction of error, the numerical value of the error score
was not predetermined apart from establishing a posi
tive correspondence between the degree of error and the
magnitude of the score.
Two tests of spontaneous flexibility were employed
(Object Naming and Utility). For the Object Naming
test, subjects were required to name instances of each
of two successively presented categories (liquids and
plants), and scores were determined by the number of
subcategorical shifts (from fruit juices to medications,
e.g.). The Utility test was similar; subjects must name
uses for each of two objects (brick and pencil), and the
number of functional shifts was scored. For the Match
test of adaptive flexibility, subjects were instructed to
vary their solutions to the problem of removing a
specified number of matches and leaving only matches
that contributed to squares; scores were tabulated by
counting the number of different solutions (removing
corner matches vs. center matches, e.g.).

Subjects
Seventy students volunteered for two sessions, par
ticipating in groups of 6-10 during the acquisition phase
and 2-5 during the test phase. They received credit
toward their introductory class grades. Groups were
assigned to acquisition conditions on the basis of
maintaining an equal male-female ratio across condi
tions.

Procedure
All subjects were told that data would be collected for
several short, unrelated experiments during the two
sessions, and that all experiments would be explained
at the end of the second session. Spiro's (1975) inci
dental instructions for processing the story were then
delivered:
This is an experiment concerned with changes in
the way people react to stories involving interper
sonal relations when there is a delay prior to giving
the reactions. You will read a story about two peo
ple. The story is true in all respects. I knew both
of the people and can vouch for the accuracy of the
story. What I would like you to do is think about
and react to the story. At the second session I will
ask you various kinds of questions concerning your
reactions to the story. Are there any questions?
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Subjects were told to use 3 minutes to read the story.
After the allotted time the stories were collected, and
approximately 8 minutes were employed by assigning
subjects to second-session dates, collecting phone
numbers for reminder calls, and instructing subjects not
to discuss the experiment between sessions. As the
experimenter reviewed the story requirements for the
second session, she very casually delivered one of the
two types of subsequent bias. (a) Bob and Margie did
get married and are very happy together to this day
(harmony) or (b) they never did get married; the en
gagement was broken, and they never saw each other
again (conflict). Therefore, consistent and contradic
tory subsequent information was presented to subjects
reading each story end. For example, the harmonious
bias was consistent with the harmonious story end and
contradictory to the story end that reported conflict.
The Object Naming test, the Utility test, and the
Match test were then administered in that order; pro
cedures included reading the printed instructions aloud
and observing the time limitations for each section.
(For additional details, see French, Ekstrom, & Price,

1963.)
Half of the subjects in each acquisition group re
turned for testing 2 days later; the remaining subjects,
after 3 weeks. The cover page of the test booklet con
tained the following instructions, which were read aloud
by the experimenter:
I'm sorry, but we deceived you. This is not a study
of how people react to situations involving interper
sonal relations. It is a study of memory. As you
will recall, at the last session you read a story.
What we would like you to do is to try to recall the
story as best you can. The following pages contain
questions concerning the story you read. Base your
answer to each question on your memory for the
story and not on your personal reactions. You
must answer every question, and you must answer
them in the order in which they are presented. Do
not look ahead or behind the question you are work
ing on. After you have answered a question, please
rate your confidence in the answer by placing a
number on the line at the bottom of the page. Use
the scale below. For example, if you write "1" you
will be indicating that you are very uncertain that
the meaning of the sentence you wrote was explicit
ly expressed in the story, "5" will indicate moderate
certainty, and "9" shows absolute certainty. Are
there any questions?
Ten minutes were allowed for recall.

Results and Discussion
Cued Recall
Scoring. Two scorers, blind to the type
of subsequent information and retention
interval, independently determined error
scores for Items 6-10. Agreement about
direction of error was 100%; agreement about

error magnitude was 89%. Where differ
ences existed, their absolute value was 1, and
all differences were resolved by the scorers
so that complete agreement was finally
reached.
The constructive error score (CES) for
each subject was computed by subtracting
from the individual item score with the
highest absolute value the absolute value of
the highest item score with the opposite sign.
For example, if a set of item scores were 0,
-3, 1, -1, 0, the CES would be -2. (Item
scores of opposite directions rarely occurred
within a subject's recall booklet.) This
method of error scoring was chosen by Spiro
(1975, 1977) to reflect that evidence for
reconstructive memory does not depend on
the number of errors. Rather, it is deter
mined by the magnitude of qualitative
change, which may be as likely to occur in
one sentence alone as in several sentences.
Constructive errors. Table 1 presents the
mean CES for each condition of this exper
iment, along with the means for the corre
sponding free recall condition in Spiro's ex
periment. The direction of errors (positive
or negative) for cued recall are identical to
those for free recall, with the exception of
cells representing the harmonious story end,
consistent subsequent information, 2-day
delay. However, neither of these means is
apparently different from zero.
For the cued-recall experiment, the major
finding was that the type of subsequent in
formation interacting with the length of the
retention interval reliably influenced mem
ory for the story. This interaction was
tested by allowing for all other effects in the
linear model, due to the nonorthogonality of
the design (Appelbaum & Cramer, 1974);
F(1, 62) = 11.237,MSe = .0084,p < .005. Of
the remaining possible main effects and in
teractions, only the main effect of the sub
sequent information was reliable beyond the
.10 level (allowing for the other effects), F(1,
62) = 39.574, MSe = .0084, p < .001. The
interpretation of these effects is clear.
When subsequent information indicated
eventual disharmony (breaking up), subjects
tended to impose or emphasize conflict in
the story they read. When subsequent in
formation indicated eventual harmony
(marriage and happiness), conflict in the
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Table 1
Mean Constructive Error Scores for Cued Recall and Free Recall (Spiro, 1977) Under Incidental
Memory Instructions
Free recall

Cued recall
Story end

Bias

2 days

3 weeks

Harmony

Consistent
Contradictory
Consistent
Contradictory

.5
-.1
-.5
1.0

1.6
-2.1

Conflict

2 days
-.2

.9
3.1
.3
3.5

-1.4
-.4
1.0

-1.2
2.3

story was reduced or harmony was exagger
ated. These effects obtained primarily after
3 weeks.
Differences between the two experiments
in magnitude of CES are apparent in Table
1. For the 3-week contradictory condition,
the magnitude of the cued-recall CES was
lower than free-recall CES, indicating that
the scoring procedure was perhaps more
conservative, or that the cuing procedure in
some way limited error magnitude. In ad
dition, cued recall CES was greater for the
3-week consistent conditions than was free
recall CES. This difference may be ac
counted for by the change in scoring proce
dures or by the possibility that in this ex
periment the effect of consistent subsequent
information was to exaggerate the harmony
or conflict in the passage.
Confidence ratings. Spiro (1975) exam
ined confidence ratings for sentences per
taining only to the issue of having children;
these sentences were presumed to be best
examples for reflecting the subsequent bias.
Only ratings for absolute error values of four
or five were contrasted to ratings for error
values of one or less. Spiro reasoned that if
errors were a result of conscious fabrication,
those that were greater in magnitude should
be more easily detected. In the cued recall

3 weeks

-

experiment, no responses to Item 8 (con
cerning the issue of children) were given
error scores large enough to adopt.Spiro's
criterion. Indeed, it is questionable if re
sponses to this item are comparable to the
types of freely recalled sentences that were
judged to concern the issue of having chil
dren; the cuing procedure is quite likely more
restrictive.
Due to these differences in scoring and
procedure, the locus of schema change was
tested by comparing ratings for correct ver
sus incorrect responses. Such a comparison
should be a very conservative test of Spiro's
locus hypothesis, in that higher ratings for
nonextreme errors should reduce the dif
ference between correct and incorrect re
sponse ratings. All five responses were
employed, since all five items were designed
to reflect the incorporation of the subse
quent information, and since they formed
the basis of all prior analyses.
As can be seen in Table 2, there was a
slight tendency in all conditions for more
subjects to rate correct responses higher than
incorrect responses. (For Spiro's, 1975,
contradictory 3-week condition, the number
of subjects showing greater confidence in
incorrect responses was five times greater
than those showing less or equal confidence.)

Table 2
Number of Subjects Showing Two Patterns of Confidence Ratings of Correct and
Incorrect Responses

3 weeks

2 days
Direction of difference
in M ratings

Consistent

Contradictory

Consistent

Contradictory

Incorrect � correct
Incorrect < correct

5
11

6
7

4
8

6
8
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Furthermore, for all 3-week subjects, confi
dence in correct sentences was reliably
greater than confidence in incorrect sen
tences; paired-comparison t(25)
3.230, SD
.409, p < .01. Since Spiro emphasized the
rating comparison for subjects hearing con
tradictory information, a separate test was
performed for these subjects; once again, the
results indicated that confidence for correct
was greater than for incorrect recall, t(13) =:
2.923, SD = .491, p < .02. Therefore,
subjects tested after 3 weeks could reliably
distinguish between their errors and correct
recall, when they were asked to do so im
mediately after retrieving specific informa
tion. However, these results do not dem
onstrate that all reconstructive effects oc
curred during retrieval; the mean difference
in ratings between correct and incorrect was
slightly greater than one. Nor do the results
implicate a conscious guessing strategy;
lower ratings could logically reflect the dif
ficulty of retrieving and integrating poorly
formulated aspects of story memory. Nev
ertheless, the existence of a rating difference
under the conditions of this' experiment
makes it difficult to argue that all construc
tive effects occurred during the retention
interval, and not during the conscious pro
cessing of story-related information. The
most reasonable conclusion concerning these
results, as well as the results of other exper
iments demonstrating memory changes, is
that changes occur due to processes operat
ing at all stages of information processing,
and are guided by the task demands.
=

=

Individual Differences

The second purpose of this experiment
was to examine the relationship between
constructive memory performance and
scores on tests of cognitive flexibility. A
multiple regression analysis was performed,
using group membership variables (type of
subsequent information, time of testing, and
their interaction) and scores on the flexibil
ity tests as predictors, and the absolute value
of the largest error (AES) as the outcome
measure. AES is the appropriate measure
for the individual difference analyses be
cause direction of error is no longer rele
vant.

The most important finding was that the
addition of the individual difference vari
ables reliably increased the predictive ability
of the regression equation, F(3, 63) = 3.195,
SE
.012, p < .03; knowledge about differ
ences in cognitive flexibility provided addi
tional information about constructive error
performance apart from knowing the pa
rameters of the experimental situation.
The predictors with weights reliably dif
ferent from zero were type of subsequent
information, F(1, 63) = 5.305, SE = .162, p
< .025; the Object Naming test, F(1, 63)
4.438, SE = .048, p < .05; and the Match
test, F(1, 63) = 5.176, SE = .039, p < .05.
These three variables provided independent
and reliable sources of information about the
variance of AES performance. Since the
magnitude of the standardized beta weights
was approximately equal for the reliable
predictors, interpreting the regression
equation is straightforward: Occurrence of
contradictory subsequent information and
high scores on the adaptive flexibility test led
to a greater degree of constructive error, and
spontaneous flexibility was positively related
to recall accuracy.
The relationships of the flexibility tests to
constructive memory performance can be
loosely interpreted as follows: Spontaneous
flexibility appears to indicate individual
abilities in maintaining separate memory
stores for the experimental materials; after
the influence of context was determined,
subjects with higher scores more accurately
recalled the story. Thus, spontaneously
flexible individuals may tend to engage in
less automatic restructuring of their expe
rience. In addition, adaptive flexibility may
be indicative of the tendency to combine
separately stored information at retrieval, as
a function of the amount of integration re
quired by the task. Presumably, task de
mands are a matter of individual perception;
for those who perceived the cues as func
tioning for the related information, adaptive
flexibility predicted their tendency to in
corporate it. More generally, support has
been provided for the assumption that the
two types of flexibility tests tap different
characteristics of cognitive behavior.
Another possible view of the relationship
of memory performance to flexibility scores
=

=

139

PASSAGE RECALL

is to attribute this relationship to a third
variable, general intelligence. There are
three objections to this approach. First,
several sources have identified measures of
flexibility as tapping individual character
istics that are different from those charac
teristics measured by intelligence tests
(Anastasi & Schaefer, 1971; Lindeman &
Fullagar, 1975; Yamamoto, 1965). The re
ported correlations are generally quite low
(approximately .20), especially for individ
uals with above average scores on intelli
gence tests. Second, if the relationship re
ported in this study could be partially ac
counted for by a general intelligence factor,
even less information about individual dif
ferences in recall accuracy would be ob
tained. This argument is based on the issue
of intelligence testing and what it tells us
about specific abilities. Guilford's factor
analytic approach to intelligence, as well as
the individual-difference approach of cog
nitive psychology, emphasizes a detailed
analysis of individual characteristics and a
convergence of these characteristics with
behaviors in certain experimental settings.
Finally, Meehl (1970) has called attention
to the fallacy of using a third factor as a co
variate for investigating relationships be
tween a naturally occurring characteristic
and some outcome variable. In the present
study, removing the variance accounted for
by a general intelligence factor would auto
matically allow some unknown fourth factor
to systematically affect the relationship be
tween flexibility and recall. In summary,
the relationship between cognitive flexibility
and recall merits attention in its own right,
apart from investigating the more general
relationship between intelligence and me
morial performance.
Conclusions
The cued-recall results of this experiment
are consistent with Spiro's (1975, 1977)
findings concerning the influence of subse
quent information on memory for an event.
As the testing interval increased, the mag
nitude of constructive errors increased, and
their direction reflected the nature of the
subsequent information. However, after 3
weeks, subjects indicated more· confidence

in correctly recalled sentences than in sen
tences containing errors. This difference in
recall confidence probably indicates that
either some constructive effects occurred
during retrieval or subjects engaged a con
scious guessing strategy. At the very least,
both types of recall were not produced by
directly accessing a stable, well-integrated
schema for ·all information related to the
story.
Second, the relationships between cogni
tive flexibility and constructive errors may
illuminate the issue concerning the locus of
constructive effects. Both the terms used to
distinguish the two types of flexibility tests
and the nature of the tasks employed suggest
that spontaneous flexibility may indicate a
reduced tendency to restructure experience,
whereas adaptive flexibility inay correspond
to characteristics of integrative recall. Thus,
the tests of cognitive flexibility may be rel
atively independent, and furthermore, they
may reflect relatively independent process
ing with regard to storage and retrieval of
real world information.
Finally, this research has implications for
educational theory and practice. Spiro
(1977) has suggested that an emphasis on
knowledge updating (incorporating new in
formation into previous structures) rather
than isolation for the purpose of test taking
(as in typical memory experiments) could
provide for richer, more particularized in
terpretations of information. In a general
sense, such an emphasis may encourage in- .
accurate memory of specific information but
increase the tendency to approach learning
and testing situations with a more flexible
cognitive set. The results from this experi
ment further suggest that knowledge struc
tures are modified both during storage and
when information from the structures is re
trieved. In addition, individuals probably
differ according to the conditions under
which they modify their schemata for events,
and one way of specifying this difference is
in terms of cognitive flexibility.
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